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NTM sensors are located in space, in the atmosphere, on the
ground, in the oceans and underground.
U.S. NTM technologies have considerable
reach and precision.
National
Technical Means
Close-in sensors could detect seismic, infrasound,
electromagnetic pulse, radionuclide and other data indicative
of a test.
After CTBT enters into force, nuclear
weapon states could locate more sensors at
test sites to lower thresholds further.
Confidence-
Building
Measures
Photos and radioactivity obtained by air and ground.  Mini
seismic arrays can observe aftershocks.  Magnetic anomalies,
SAR, soil data obtained with GPS locations.
Any CTBT party can request an OSI, which
needs 30 of 51 votes in the Executive Council.
On-Site
Inspections
United States has four classified SAR satellites.  Europe,
Canada and Japan sell unclassified SAR data for as low as
$1,000 each.
InSAR can measure subsidence as low as 0.2-
0.5 cm in many locations, with yields above 1
kton at 500 m depth.  InSAR can determine
locations to 100 meters.
InSAR
(Interferometric
Synthetic
Aperture Radar)
IMS will use 80 particulate monitoring stations, and 40 of
these will also detect radioxenon.  NTM sensors can also be
placed on airplanes for close approaches to suspected test
sites.
NAS concludes that explosions above 0.1–1
kton can be detected to identify the event as a
nuclear explosion.  The 0.6 kton North
Korean test was detected at 7,000 km
distance.
Radionuclide
IMS will use 60 infrasound monitoring stations.NAS concluded that explosions above 1 kton
in the atmosphere can be detected, and above
0.5 kton over continents.
Infrasound
IMS will use six hydrophone arrays and five T-phase
monitoring stations.
NAS concluded that explosions above a few
kilograms can be detected in Southern
Hemisphere, and above 1 ton for all oceans.
Hydroacoustic
IMS will use 50 primary and 120 auxiliary seismic stations.
Arrays of seismographs and regional seismographs can
obtain lower threshold yields. In addition, thousands of non-
IMS stations have data that could trigger an on-site
inspection.
NAS concluded that explosions above 0.1
kton in hard rock can be detected in Asia,
Europe, North America and North Africa.
Tests in cavities can be detected above 1-2
kton for advanced nuclear weapon states,
with risk of venting and excursion yields.
This limit is perhaps 0.1 kt for new nuclear
nations.
Seismic
IMS Assets (when complete)Description#1  Method
4Regional Seismic:  DPRK, 9 Oct. 2006 (0.6kton)
22 IMS stations (60% complete)
[May 2009, 2.5 kt, 61 IMS (70% = 120/170)]
mb = 4.0, 4.0, 1.9 (0.002 kt) => limit 0.002 kt, Richards/Kim
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7 Status of IMS Monitoring Stations (9/2009)
 under          
total           planning     const         testing      certified
primary seismic 50   3    3    6    38
auxiliary seismic 120  6 12 19  83
hydroacoustic 11   0    1     0    10
infrasound 60 12    7     2    39
radionuclide 80  7 12   7  54
     noble gases (40) (20)   (20)
radnuc labs                  16              6                  0                 0               10
TOTAL 337  33  29   26  249
 10%  9%    8%  74%
Total of certified + testing + under construction 
Total = 249 + 26 + 29 = 304/337 = 90.2%
8Cooperative Measures
-- Not a condition of ratification, but bilaterally over time,
step by step, by agreement or reciprocal unilateral, as trust
increases.
-- OUO reports from LANL and LLNL
-- My initial suggestions are:
at the edge of the test sites:
-- passive seismic
-- radioxenon and particulate monitoring
-- infrasound
9Technologies
•   analog to digital seismographs
•   narrow-band to broad-band seismographs
•   1-axis to 3-axis to arrays
•   increased density of seismic stations
•   correlation detection
•   teleseismic to close-in regional
•   other technologies assist seismology
Analysis
•   magnitude picks to correlated templates for 
similar paths
•   improved earth models, improved algorithms
•   discriminate sources in frequency bands above 5 Hz
•   geological bias, preferential absorption
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Monitoring Progress
Arrays detect and identify events to a threshold of 2–2.5 mb from over 2000 km
away, corresponding to explosive yields less than 0.01 kt for tamped explosions and
less than 1 kt for an explosion decoupled in a large cavity.
Monitoring with regional waves Pn, Lg and coda regional waves is very
encouraging.  Using old Soviet data 500–1500 km from Semipalatinsk Test Site,
seismic signals were located for all but two tests over one ton.  Regional spectra
contain more information than the narrowband magnitudes.
If the 120 IMS auxiliary stations are operated in near-real-time, the thresholds can
be lowered by 0.25–0.5 mb.
All primary stations could become array stations.
Data from the 87 Global Seismic Network stations not in auxiliary network could
be co-listed in the IMS event bulletins.  Many other international stations are
available.
New algorithms for regional seismology and seismic models enhance abilities to
discriminate between event sources below 3.5 mb.
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Correlation detection can lower threshold by 0.5–1.0 mb for arrays and triple axis
networks.  Extremely useful for former test sites and is being extended to earthquakes,
such as 1997 Kara Sea event.
Cross-correlation of seismic waveforms can reduce location uncertainties by 10–100
from those initial–wave times in seismic–active regions or in former test sites.
InSAR measures subsidence after nuclear tests with an accuracy of a few mm
and location accuracy of less than 100 m.  Threshold for InSAR to locate
nuclear tests is less than 1 kt if SAR data was taken prior to the nuclear test.
If prior SAR data does not exist, then the threshold is higher, perhaps 20 kt.
InSAR also detects test–site activity.
Cooperative measures near test sites can detect yields of less than 10 kg
(equivalent) by using passive–seismic, infrasound, EMP, and video sensors.
Dosimeters next to experiments can detect milligram fission and fusion
yields.
See Kvaerna and Ringdal (ISS-Seismo-15) quantify and rank primary and
auxiliary IMS stations.
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#2:  Decoupled Tests in Cavities
Must accurately predict yield to avoid yield excursions.  Average yield of seven first
tests is 22 kt (9–65 kt), then DPRK at 0.6 kt.   It is difficult for new nuclear nations
to obtain a specific yield of, for example, 0.1 or 1.0 kt
Need to hide removed materials from satellites.
Surface subsidence after nuclear test of few mm is observable with InSAR with
100–m location accuracy.  Indian and Pakistani tests easily located with optical
SPOT images with 5–m resolution
Radionuclide venting is a serious risk.  The Soviet Union did not contain 90% of the
underground tests at NZTS from 1964 to 1988 (40% for all underground Soviet
tests).  US had significant releases as late as 1986.  Venting very serious risk for
beginning nuclear states.  See “Radiological Effluents Released from U.S.
Continental Tests (1961-92), DOE/NV UC-702.
Regional waves at higher frequencies with lowered decoupling factor.
Series of tests needed to develop significant weapons.
NTM data may be used by the CTBT Executive Council.
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NAS 2002):  fully–decoupled explosion larger than 1–2 kt
cannot be confidently hidden in a cavity, particularly for a new
nuclear state
Psuccess = !i Pi = (Pventing)(Pyield-exccursion)(Phide-materials)(Psubsidence) x
(Pregional-seismic)(Ptest-series)(PNTM)
• High confidence 90% for each step gives Psuccess = (0.9)
7 = 48%
• 4 failure paths, Psuccess = 66%
• Yield prediction and venting at medium confidence,
Psuccess = (0.9)
5(0.5)2 = 15%
• National Intelligence Estimate and related papers didn’t addresses this.
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Evasion Scenarios, Possibilities vs. Probabilities
1. Difficult to make a NNWS warhead to 1.0 kt, or 0.1 kt
2. Difficulty to Instrument the covert test
3. Military Significance of Violation
4. Nitze-Baker definition of Effective Verification
5. Net Benefit Analysis of the Treaty (importance of gains
and losses if cheating happens)
6. Other assets, auxiliary, arrays, NTM, venting, significant
yield excursions,
7. Detection level clearly below 3.5, which is arbitrary.
8. Identification level of good signals is about same as
detection level.
9. Don’t use NTS conversion for remainder of the Earth.
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#3:  IMS Seismic Auxiliary Network (Hafemeister, ICC-Sesimo-12)
number of stations  (Prim. + Aux.)/Prim  = 170/50 = 3.4.
access ratio: rPA/rP  =  1/(3.4)
1/2   =  1/1.84 = 0.54  =  0.5.
Cautious assumption, Lg amplitude falls as the inverse of the square root of the distance
(1/r0.5) from the source.  This ignores faster fall-off of more important Pg wave amplitude
that falls as the inverse of the distance (1/r).  Also ignore the frequency dependent
attenuation factor, Q(f), which reduces the amplitude of the very relevant higher
frequency waves.
The total seismic power Pseismic over a cylindrical area of depth H and circumference 2"r,
gives average seismic power flux of
pseismic  = Pseismic/H2!r.
Seismic power is proportional to the yield of the explosion Y, giving seismic power flux
proportional to yield over distance.
pseismic  #   Y/r.
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The more distant P seismograph is sensitive to a threshold amplitude (AT) from
a threshold yield YT at a distance rT
 AT  =  c (YT/rT)
1/2,
where c is a constant.
Seismic magnitude is m  =   a log(Y) + b,
Reduction in threshold magnitudes from the P network to the PAux network is
$mT  = mTP   - mTPAux  = [a log(YTP)  +  b]
                                -  [a log(YTPAux)  +  b]
=  a log(YTP/YTPAux)  = a log(2) =  (0.8) (0.30)  =  0.25.
Result for PLg waves would be $mT = 0.5.  Other factors must be
considered, but clearly the auxiliary network makes a valuable,
understated, contribution.
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#4:  Effective Verification
“....if the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty
in any militarily significant way, we would be able to
detect such violation in time to respond effectively and
thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation.”
[Paul Nitze, INF Ratification 1988]
“Additionally, the verification regime should enable us to
detect patterns of marginal violations that do not present
immediate risk to the US security.”  [James Baker,
START Ratification 1992]
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How Much Verification Is Enough?
Detect one of n covert tests.  Pn = 1 – (1 – P1)
n.
3–test detection 1 test 3 tests
high confidence  Ph  = 0.9 P3 = 0.999
medium confidence Pm = 0.5 P3 = 0.88
low confidence  Pl  = 0.1 P3 = 0.27
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Analysis should include:
-- multiple tests
-- auxiliary net (- 0.25-0.5 mb) plus NTM, GSN, etc.
-- NTM
-- a cheater wants 90% success rate gives a 10%
detect/identification rate.  A 10% D/I rate lowers the
threshold yield by about 0.5 mb with respect to a 90%
D/I rate. [O. Dahlman, et al, Nuclear Test Ban, p. 167.]
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2200 Warheads in 2012
1400:  14 Tridents (12x120 operational, 2x120 in maintenance)
  450:  450 Minuteman III
!300:   56 B52, 21 B2 heavy bombers
Reserve forces (2500):  Trident overhaul (200), response force [1000 upload
aircraft, 350 bombs under US/NATO control, 300 SLCMs].
Russia projected to have 1500 operational warheads after 2012.
400 on Topol-M (SS–27, 10/year which, carry 1–4 warheads?)  Slow
progress on 2 Borey–class submarines with Bulava SLBMs and on aviation
forces, both these legs could carry 500–700 warheads.  Russia could destroy:
Destroy Survive
300:    all heavy bombers off alert   0
500–700:   33–50% SLBMs  700–1000
350:           80% of US ICBMs                100_______________
1150-1350   Total 800-1100 + tacticals + reserves
Worse-case analysis applied to START I and II by SFRC.
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#5.  Interferometric Synthetic Aperature (InSAR)
OSI Location:  InSAR can locate to 100 m = 0.1 km, an area
of 0.01 km2, which is 10-5 of the OSI limited area of 1,000
km2.
InSAR should examine the “deep-thick” salt deposits.
If a favorable location, InSAR can detect and locate 1 kt tests
at the depth of 500; NTS very good, Lop Nor less so.
InSAR can discriminate between explosions and earthquakes.
InSAR software and commercial digital data is not expensive,
and readily available, as a common university research skill.
22
InSAR: ML = 3.9, 4.4, 2.7 at 340, 401, 244 m
Chemical Ex. (NPE): 1.4 kt, 405 m, 4.1 MLL
P. Vincent, GRL 30(22), 2141 (2003)
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London Jubilee line, 20 m
1992–2001, 2.5 cm linear
error less than 2 mm
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#6.  Radionuclide Monitoring
IMS stations improve by a factor in 10 years.
Atmospheric tests easily detected
Underground tests have leaded in the past (slide 10)
Air or closer ground sensors can enhance flux by more than a
million (nearer and sooner; ie., DPRK-1).  A publicized US
aircraft capability can deter tests.  This should be public and
not classified.
Medical Mo99 production facilities increase background much
more than reactors.  What is the cost to capture and
temporarily hold Xe at these few sites?
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#7:  Warhead Reliability, Safety and Missions
1. Safety is not a primary issue.
2. Successful Life Extension Program, W76, W87
3. Los Alamos reestablishes ability to make new pits, W88
4. NNSA (reviewed by JASON) determines that pits will not have
aging effects for at least 85-100 years (with Pu-238).  Ageing
problems are with the non-nuclear components which can be
tested.  In the past, tested rarely for reliability.
5. More robust tritium transfer system devised.
6. Margins to Uncertainties (M/U) improves as margins have been
increased and uncertainties reduced
7. 3-d calculations, DAHRT and NIF
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•One US nuclear weapon accident since 1968, the 1980 liquid-fueled
Titan in a silo in Arkansas.  No radioactivity was spread.
•Two accidents spread considerable radioactivity, both airplane
accidents at Palomares, Spain (1966) and Thule, Greenland (1968).
Practically all (29 of 32) nuclear weapon accidents resulted from
aircraft accidents.
•No longer use liquid-fueled missiles, SRAMs or unsafe battle field
weapons.  Now fly/store bombers without nuclear weapons, removing
most of the problem.
• Cost to mitigate to save a life by adding fire resistant pits and
insensitive high explosive for ICBM/SLBMs too expensive (DoD of
both parties).
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Kill probability of hard-target warheads as a
function of n warheads (no fratricide).
Pk1= R x SSKP(Y, H, CEP)
Let SSKP = 1, then Pk1 = R
Pkn = 1 – (1 – Pk1)
n = 1 – (1 – R )n
For R=0.5; Pk1 = 0.5, Pk2 = 0.75, Pk3 = 0.88
For R=0.25; Pk1 = 0.25, Pk2 = 0.44, Pk3 = 0.58
Large reductions of 50% and 75% are of concern only for the
case of a pre-emptive attack on a large nuclear force, where
all the enduring warheads would be used and couldn’t be
exchanged.
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50% Yield Reductions:
H=2000 psi, R=0.9, CEP = 0.05 nmi = 100 m
50% yields:  Y(W88)=455 kt, Y(W76) = 100 kt,
455 kt 228 kt 100 kt 50 kt
P1 0.90 0.88 0.80 0.67
P2 0.9895 0.9849 0.957 0.888
P3 0.9989 0.9981 0.991 0.963
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#8.  NPT-CTBT Connection.
The 19 April 1995 Letter to the 1995 NPT-Review and Extension
Conference by France, Russia, UK and US (China agreed later) stated
a determination to complete the CTBT with a request to the NNWSs
that the NPT provisions be made permanent (the quid pro quo):
We reaffirm our determination to continue to negotiate
intensively, as a high priority, a universal and multilaterally
and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test–ban
treaty, and we pledge our support for its conclusion without
delay.
We call upon all States parties to the [NPT] Treaty to make
the treaty provisions permanent.  This will be crucial for the
full realization of the goals set out in Article VI.
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1995 Statement Accompanying the renewal of the NPT
without a time limit.  This was the one big chance for NNWS
states to have leverage on the NWS states.
“The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the
negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively
verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Bay Treaty no later
than 1996.  Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive
test Ban Treaty, the nuclear weapon states should exercise
utmost restraint.”
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UN General Assembly CTBT Laudatory Votes
2003: 173 - 1 - 3
2004: 177 - 2 - 3
2005: 172 - 1 - 3
2006: 172 - 2 - 3
2007: 176 - 1 - 3
2008: 175 - 1 - 3
Total: 1045 - 8 (6US, DPRK, Palau) -
18 (6India, 6Mauritius, 6Syria)
Colombia ratifies in 2008, -5 abstentions
